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Abstract: Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be
addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts.  Recent models of non-pecuniary
motives can be classified as either altruism-based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based.  We
estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using experimental data.  We
then offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches, thereby allowing for
nested hypothesis testing and for determining the relative strength of each of the competing
theories.  In addition, the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in
different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it.  Using this
flexible form for nested tests, we find that intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and
altruistic considerations all play a significant role in players' decisions.2
1. INTRODUCTION
A broad set of experimental results indicates that people frequently choose actions
that do not maximize their monetary payoffs.  People reject positive offers in the ultimatum
game, make positive allocations to anonymous parties in the dictator game, and make
voluntary public contributions that reduce their own material reward.
1  There is field
evidence as well, as seen in anonymous charitable contributions.  It is now generally
accepted that many people have social or psychological considerations which can lead them
to sacrifice monetary payoffs in the course of maximizing their utility.  This can have
substantial economic consequences even for those who do, in fact, maximize only their own
expected monetary payoff.
What are the underlying motivations in these cases?  In the past few years there have
been a number of theories attempting to explain this behavior. One explanation is simple
altruism, where people care not only about their own material well-being but also about the
material well-being of others.  However, theories of altruism may be overly simplistic, as an
agent is assumed to assign a constant weight to the welfare of every other individual.
Another approach expands the altruism principle by incorporating distributive concerns.
Under such models, also known as equity (or fairness) models, one’s regard for another
person’s monetary well-being depends on the other person’s monetary payoff relative to
one’s own.  Current models in this category are Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) [henceforth,
BO], and Fehr and Schmidt (1997) [henceforth, FS].  Finally, “reciprocity” theories expand
the principle of altruism in a different direction, asserting that regard for someone else’s
payoff depends on how ‘kind’ the other is perceived to be.  The principle of reciprocal
                                                       
1 Roth (1995), Güth and Tietz (1990),  and Ledyard (1995) offer some surveys of this literature.3
altruism emphasizes the relationship between one’s action and one’s beliefs about the
intentions of the other agent(s).  The leading model in this category is Rabin (1993), while
Levine (1996) offers an alternative formulation.
The issue of which approach, if any, best explains experimental data remains open.
Each have been shown to effectively explain outcomes in only some proper subset of the
various experimental settings. However, as stated by BO (pg. 1), "if no connections can be
found, we are left with a set of disjoint behavioral charts, each valid on a limited domain."
Some have argued that one must combine the insights of altruism, distributive concerns, and
reciprocity to obtain a sufficiently descriptive model.  In this paper, we estimate
representative models from these general approaches and suggest a simple encompassing
approach to estimation which nests altruism, distributive concerns, and reciprocity.  Our
encompassing approach allows for nested comparisons and testing of leading models and
offers a flexible alternative that can potentially overcome some of their limitations.
2. THE LITERATURE
In the ultimatum game, one person in a mutually anonymous pair proposes a division
of a sum of money to the other person, who chooses to either accept the proposal or reject
it.  A rejection means both people receive no money.  As rejections are not uncommon
(particularly with rather uneven proposals), it seems that people are sometimes willing to
deliberately sacrifice money.  Using a sequential version of the ultimatum game, Ochs and
Roth (1989) demonstrated that many players would reject a proposed positive sum of
money and subsequently make counter-proposals which, if accepted, would give them less4
money than would the original proposal, but would still give them more money than the
other player.
2
These disadvantageous counter-offers were explained by Bolton (1991).  The main
feature of this model is that an individual’s utility is composed of both her material payoffs
and some disutility when her monetary reward is smaller than that of the other player.
However, people don’t mind at all if the disparity in material payoffs is in their favor.  While
this model explains ultimatum game behavior, it does not address results such as positive
dictator game allocations and the costly effort provision found in gift-exchange experiments,
(e.g., Fehr et al, 1993).
Rabin (1993) suggests that intentional reciprocity, both positive and negative, can
play a role.  However, his conventional model does not explain the ‘reciprocity-free’
component of distributive concerns, which seems to be present in many experimental results.
Levine (1996) combines both general altruistic or spiteful tendencies with a personal
component which accommodates a form of reciprocity.  However, this model does not
permit any influence for comparative payoffs and the range of the non-pecuniary term is
rather limited.
BO address the asymmetry of the Bolton (1991) model by asserting that people
suffer disutility whenever payoffs are unequal; it is assumed that this disutility is symmetric
with respect to which player receives the greater material payoff.  However, reciprocity and
intention are excluded from this theory, as the authors argue that there is little laboratory
evidence that these have significant influence.  FS allow for an asymmetric effect of relative
payoffs with a self-centered inequality aversion.  Both models have a moderate degree of
                                                       
2 There was a substantial discount factor between periods.5
success in explaining behavior in bilateral bargaining, public goods environments, and
markets.
However, neither the BO model nor the FS model can explain results such as Blount
(1995) and Charness (1996).  Blount elicits ‘minimum acceptable offers’ in a strategy-
method version of the ultimatum game.  A comparison between treatments where this offer
is said to be generated by either a random mechanism or a self-interested party shows a clear
difference (the minimum acceptable offer averages 12% of the pie in the former case, but
29% in the latter).  Charness isolates the specific role of intention in the “gift-exchange”
setting by comparing the effort/wage gradient when wages are determined by the employer
or by a random mechanism, finding that this component is significant, although smaller than
the component for distributive concerns.  On the other hand, studies such as Bolton,
Brandts, and Katok (1997) and Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels (1997) find no statistically
significant effect for intention, although the latter study states (pg. 12) that “the difference in
average contributions is equal to 12%.”
The psychology literature provides support for including reciprocity in a model of
economic behavior.  Heider (1958) introduced the idea that causal inference, where one
takes into account another person’s motives and situational constraints, is an important
cognitive process for perceiving social contexts.  Individuals have a need to infer causes and
to attempt to assign responsibility for outcomes.  When volition is absent, feelings of
revenge and gratitude dissipate or vanish.
3  Experimental studies include Greenberg and
Frisch (1972), who find that help which is deliberately given leads to more reciprocity than
                                                       
3 “Feelings of both revenge and gratitude become markedly attenuated ... upon the discovery that the harm or
the benefit [to the individual] was not the true goal of the agent.  ... Gratitude is determined by the will, the6
does accidental help, and Goranson and Berkowitz (1966), who confirm a differential
sequential response conditioned on prior help provided by another agent.
4
3. THE EXPERIMENT
We examine data from Charness (1996).  A total of 122 subjects participated in this
experiment; 61 each in the ‘employee’ and ‘employee’ roles.  Average earnings (including a
$5 show-up fee) were between $16 and $17 in a session of less than 2 hours.  All subjects
were students at the University of California at Berkeley.  The design was quite similar to
the BGE/TC treatment in Fehr et al (1998; preliminary version in 1994); the only change
was that employees could not reject the wage.
5  There were, in general, ten employers and
ten employees in each session, where a session consisted of ten periods. Employers and
employees initially all met in one large room.  Pairings were anonymous and it was common
knowledge that employees and employers were not re-matched.
6
An employee was given a wage, which had been assigned by either an employer or
an external process.  The process by which the wage was determined was fully known to the
employee.  No employee was in more than one of the treatments, since each session was a
different treatment.  Once assigned a wage, each employee was asked to record her effort
choice (between 0.1 and 1.0, inclusive) on a record sheet.  The monitor then gave this sheet
                                                                                                                                                                        
intention, of the benefactor.  Attribution to source and intention has similar significance in the case of
revenge.”  (Heider, 1958, p. 265)
4 See also Thibaut and Riecken (1955), Kelley and Stahelski (1970), Kahn and Tice (1973), and Thomas and
Batson (1981).
5 The complete instructions can be obtained by contacting the first author or can be downloaded from:
http://www.econ.upf.es/cgi-bin/onepaper?283.
6 In some cases, there were less than 20 subjects in a session, so that there was inevitably some re-matching.
However, these were still anonymous and subjects were assured that no pairing would be repeated in two
consecutive periods.  A careful analysis of the data (see Charness, 1996) shows that there were no apparent
reputation effects.7
to the corresponding employer in the other room, so that the employer had physical evidence
of the employee’s choice.  This procedure was common knowledge.
The combination of wage and effort determined outcomes and monetary payoffs for
each pair of subjects in a period.  Each employer was given an endowment of 120 “income
coupons” in each period.  The monetary payoff functions were given by:
￿F = (120 – w)￿e, (1)
and
￿E = w – c(e) – 20 (2)
where  ￿F denotes the payoff to the ‘employer’ (firm), ￿E denotes the payoff to the
‘employee,’ e denotes the employee’s effort, w is the wage, and c(e) is the cost of effort, a
non-linear function increasing in e. The exact cost function facing an employee is as follows:
Effort 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Cost 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
The innovation in this experiment was that the source of the wage differed across
sessions and was known to be generated by either a self-interested employer, a draw from a
bingo cage, or the experimenter (in advance).  Only one wage-determination mechanism was
used in each session.
Note that the unique Nash equilibrium (which can be easily deduced by backwards
induction) of w = 20 and e = 0.1 is socially inferior as there are many outcomes which would
make both players better off.  Indeed, employees and employers consistently deviate from8
their Nash equilibrium choices, with employers providing on average wages in excess of 50
and employees providing an average effort levels greater than 0.3.
4. THE THEORY
This section is divided into four sub-sections. Each of the first three sections presents
a simple representative model corresponding to a general approach. The last section presents
an approach which nests these approaches, thereby providing a useful tool for comparison of
behavioral motives.
It is common in experimental design of this nature to estimate only the second
mover’s utility function.  Since estimating a utility function for the first mover, the employer,
involves specifying expectations on the second mover’s actions, it is easier (if we are willing
to relax the assumption of equilibrium beliefs) to estimate only the employee’s utility
function based on her choices, taking the employer’s action and her perception of the
employer's intentions as given.  Hence, all utility functions in the sections that follow will be
defined for the employee only.
4.1 Altruism
The basic altruism model in this setting would postulate a utility function for the
employee of the form:
UE(￿) = ￿E + a ￿F , (3)
where a, the altruism parameter, is constant over the payoff space in this formulation.
“Altruists” are considered to have a > 0, while a equals 0 for pure money-maximizers.  It is
also generally accepted that  a < 1.  In other words, another person’s monetary payoff is not9
as rewarding as one’s own.  While each individual has a distinct value for a, this value is
independent of previous actions or history for other agents.
4.2 Fairness and distributive justice
4.2.1 The egalitarian notion of fairness
The egalitarian notion of fairness implies that a fair distribution assigns everyone an
equal share of resources.  Two simple models corresponding to this notion are BO and FS.
Although there are some qualitative differences between the BO and FS models, they
generally make similar behavioral predictions, particularly in the case of two agents. We use
the FS model for purposes of comparison. Applying the two-agent version of this model to
the gift-exchange setting, we have:
UE(￿) = ￿E - a[max (￿F - ￿E, 0)] - b [max (￿E - ￿F, 0)] , (4)
where it is assumed that b £ a and 0 £ b < 1.  This means that, in addition to being
concerned with one’s own pecuniary reward, one also cares about equity.  Furthermore,
assuming b > 0, one’s disutility is increasing in the distance between payoffs. This
parsimonious model captures the concept that one cares about one’s payoff not only in
absolute terms but also in comparison to others.  However, a potential drawback (due to the
non-negativity restriction on the model’s parameters) is that this model does not nest simple
altruism, where one receives some positive utility from the level of another agent’s material
payoff, independently of one’s own.10
Another drawback is that often a and b cannot both be estimated. Note that in
ultimatum games only a can be estimated.
7  In the gift-exchange context, only b can be
estimated, as the only way for an employee to sacrifice monetary payoffs when assigned an
unfavorable wage is to increase her effort, thereby rewarding the employer for his unkind
behavior!
A third concern involves the linearity of one’s utility in the payoff difference.  It may
not be reasonable to expect a sharp discontinuity, at the reference point, in the weight one
assigns to the other’s payoff.  Furthermore, it may be unreasonable to expect one's weight in
a close neighborhood of the reference point to be the same as when the outcome reflects
substantial inequity.  A quadratic function in the payoff difference might seem more
plausible.  However, the first order condition with such a representation makes the problem
rather intractable.  Moreover, coefficients lose the interpretation of weight on inequality.
4.2.2 Other notions of fairness
Two common alternative concepts of distributive justice are the utilitarian and
Rawlsian social welfare functions.  The utilitarian view asserts that people should maximize
some function which is monotonically increasing in the well-being of each member of
society.  The simplest utilitarian model maximizes the sum of payoffs (eq (3) with a = 1).
On the other hand, the Rawlsian approach involves maximizing the payoff of the worst-off
agent.
                                                       
7 In order to be able to estimate one's weight on inequality, some inequality-reducing action must be
observed that goes counter to money-maximizing behavior.  One rarely observes a responder rejecting an
offer (the only way to sacrifice monetary payoffs) which would favor her in relative material payoffs. Such a
rejection would amount to punishing the proposer for his apparent generosity!11
Two other results shed some light on these differing notions of equity.
8  A third
player (henceforth, player C) was to choose an outcome for two anonymous players.
9  In
one treatment, C was asked to choose between (1200,0) and (400,400) for players (A,B);
here 18/22 (82%) subjects picked (400,400).  Yet, in the second treatment, when C chose
between (750,375) and (400,400), only 11/24 (46%) selected (400,400).  The difference is
significant (c
2 test) at a p-value of .01. In the first case, the egalitarian and Rawlsian notions
win over the simple utilitarian model; however, this is reversed in the second case.
Thus, it appears that equity is not limited to considerations of equality.  Although
agents’ relative shares may be important, so is the total amount to be distributed.  This
suggests that inequality aversion is not the only proxy for fairness.  As we find in section 6,
the FS model does not fare well with the gift-exchange results.  Yet distributive concerns are
the only plausible explanation for non-minimal effort provision in the non-volitional




A critical question concerns the effects of the perceived intentions of others on
behavior.  While evidence from laboratory experiments is mixed, one should bear in mind
that these settings have anonymous players and relatively little visceral impact; hence one
cannot readily induce the full spectrum of emotional interaction in a laboratory environment.
                                                       
8 These results can be found in Charness and Rabin (1999).
9 C was credibly assured that her own payoffs would be the same in all cases and it was clear that the payoffs
of other people would be affected by the choice made.
10 Recall that altruism is a subset of the utilitarian notion of fairness.12
The final paragraph of FS states: “The idea that an action is judged not only in terms of its
consequences, but also in terms of its intentions, certainly has some appeal.”
Suppose an agent cares about money and comparative payoffs, but also has feelings
(regard) about another agent’s absolute payoffs.  If this regard for another person depends
on one’s perceptions of that person’s prior actions, we would require a model of reciprocity,
or reciprocal altruism, as exemplified by Rabin (1993) and Levine (1996).  The key to these
models is that one’s utility is affected by one’s perception of another agent’s “type.”  A
potential drawback is that reciprocity models do not generally nest or explicitly incorporate
concerns for relative payoffs or altruistic behavior.
We present the framework of Rabin (1993). The employee's kindness to the
employer as a function of effort is given by
) w | e ( ) w | e (
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= ￿  is the suggested  reference point.
11  Given
that all points are Pareto-efficient,  ) w | e ( max
F ￿ denotes the maximum that the employer
could make given the wage w.  Similarly,  ) w | e ( min
F ￿  denotes the minimum that the
employer could make given the wage w.
                                                       
11 This reference point may be inappropriate in an equilibrium model.  However,  e
F ￿  drops out in the first
order condition of maximization w.r.t. e.  Careful attention will be given to  e
E ￿ .13
To gauge the employer’s kindness (as perceived by the employee, a critical issue
here), we would need to know the employee’s belief about the employer’s belief about the
relationship of effort to the wage assigned.  For example, if the employee believed that the
employer expected the same effort regardless of the wage, any wage above 20 would be
considered “kind.”  However, if the employee believes that the employer is merely offering a
higher wage in an attempt to maximize her own expected earnings, one might consider a
kind wage to be one that exceeds the profit-maximizing level.
As we are unable to observe an employee’s beliefs, we shall assume that he knows
that the employer knows that this profit-maximizing wage is 70, which is ex post seen to
have actually yielded the employer the highest expected profits, as is shown in the figure
below:
Insert figure 1 here
Incidentally, a wage of 70 is the reference point (the wage that would yield the middle point
in the opponent’s payoff given the opponent's action) suggested by Rabin (1993).  Hence,











e = 70. Thus, the values of fF and fE must lie in the interval [-1/2, 1/2].  These
kindness functions can now be used to specify the employee's preferences:14
UE = PE + fF fE  (7)
The central behavioral feature of this utility specification reflects the main principle in
models of reciprocity: If the employee believes that the employer is treating him poorly (fF <
0) then he will reciprocate with a negative value for fE and would attempt to reduce the
employer’s payoff.  On the other hand, if the employee believes that the employer is treating
him favorably  (fF > 0), then he prefers fE > 0 and will sacrifice money to benefit the
employer, leading to a non-minimal choice of effort.
A variation on this functional form, also given by Rabin (1993), nests altruism as a
special case.  This formulation (henceforth Rabin II) is:
UE = PE + [a + (1-a) fF] fE. (8)
In this utility function, when a > 0 the employee will wish to be kind to the employer, even
when the latter is “neutral” to the employee.  If a is close to 1, then pure altruism dominates
behavior.  Because the kindness functions are bounded above and below, the behavior in this
model is sensitive to the scale of material payoffs.
Rabin’s model is qualitative in nature and does not provide the relative power of
non-pecuniary versus material interests.  However, Rabin acknowledges that the non-
pecuniary term in the utility function must be re-scaled to correspond to the payoff scale.
Here the scaling factor should be proportional to the range of payoffs for the employer, so
the applicable factor is the payoff range for the employer, which is 0.9·(120 - w).  Besides15
re-scaling the non-pecuniary term to the employer’s payoff scale, this scaling factor has the
desirable feature that when the employer is neutral, the model reverts to the simple altruism
model of Eq (3) and a is the same as the altruism parameter therein.  Given the specification
of fE and fF and the re-scaling by 0.9·(120 - w), we get
UE = PE + [a + (1-a) (
100
70 w -
)] (e - 0.55) (120 - w). (9)
4.4 An encompassing approach
While all of these models have a considerable degree of success in explaining
deviations from monetary payoff maximization, each fails to plausibly account for a non-
trivial proportion of observed behavior.  One relatively parsimonious combination of these
models is:
UE(x) = PE + R(w) PF (10)
where R(w) represents the regard of the employee for the employer as a function of the
employer’s action.
Definition:
Regard is the weight in one's utility function relative to one's monetary payoff on the
monetary payoff of the other's.  Regard is defined as a function of the state of the world
(initial endowments) and the other's (observed or expected) action.16
Claim: When the regard is formulated as R(w) = dD + a + b w + c w
2 + d w
3 + e w
4, where
(d, a,
 b, c, d, e) are parameters to be estimated and D is a dummy variable taking the value of
1 when PE > PF and 0 otherwise, pure altruism, Fehr-Schmidt equity (with either two
fairness parameters or one), and Rabin reciprocity are all special cases of this formulation.
I. Imposing the restriction that d = b = c = d = e = 0, we get the pure altruism case of Eq(3)
with a = a.
II. Imposing the restriction that b = c = d = 0, we get the Fehr-Schmidt formulation of Eq(4)











III. Imposing the restrictions that b = 
170
a 1-
 and d = c = d = 0, we get the Rabin formulation
of Eq (9) with a = 1- 100 b.
Therefore, we can use simple likelihood-ratio hypothesis testing to compute a
significance level for each approach and compare the approaches’ relative strengths.  In
addition, our approach by itself provides a flexible alternative to assess a functional form in
different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it.  For
example, when there is no intention (as is the case the non-volition treatments), the
encompassing model is better suited to examine distributive concerns since the linearity
restriction on the payoff difference is eliminated.  Theoretical justification aside, R(w) can be
thought of as a flexible fourth-degree polynomial approximation of an unknown function in
the wage.17
An important difference from the conventional Rabin model is that R(w) is not
necessarily 0 in the default case, when the employer has had no choice to make.
5. PRELIMINARY TESTS AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
We begin by examining whether we can pool observations over time-periods.  While,
in principle, the matching protocol prevents reputation effects from forming, players may be
nevertheless modifying their behavior over time.  Looking at the average effort, wage, and
effort/wage ratio for each period (Appendix B), there are no apparent changes in behavior.
Simple joint hypothesis F-tests (Appendix B) confirm this assertion. This is consistent with
similar findings by Fehr and co-authors in gift-exchange experiments.
Next we examine whether the two non-volition treatments (bingo cage draws and
experimenter-determined wage) can be pooled with each other and/or whether they can be
pooled with the volition (employer-determined wages) case.  If we were to find no
significant difference between behavior in volition and non-volition sessions, we would be
able to eliminate intentional reciprocity as a factor.
13  For that purpose, we adopt simple
flexible parametric testing procedures.  Each treatment’s effort levels can be estimated as a
function of effort on wage.  A flexible functional form is the polynomial function.  A fifth-
degree polynomial was used (higher-order polynomials did not significantly improve
likelihood), of the form: effort =  i 5
0 i
i wage c ￿ ￿
=
.  This functional form was estimated for each
of the treatments using the Tobit procedure (effort is left-censored at 0.1, with numerous
observations of e = 0.1).  Next, the two non-volition treatments were pooled and the
                                                                                                                                                                        
12 If this last expression is unreadable,  it should read b = (a+d)/(1+a+d).18
parameter estimates from the pooled regression were imposed on each of the three sessions.
The statistic for the likelihood ratio test is c
2 = -2 (log Lr – log Lu), where Lr is the restricted
likelihood and Lu is the unrestricted one. Under the null, this statistic is distributed with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions (in our case, 6).  The statistics for the
three treatments are:
Bingo-cage:  -2*[(-99.1221) - (-99.1055)]    = 0.0332
Experimenter-determined:  -2*[(-78.6198) - (-78.2930)]    = 0.6536
Employer-determined:  -2*[(-117.334) - (-87.0608)]    = 60.547
Critical Value at the 5% level of significance is 12.592.
Hence, we cannot reject pooling the two non-volition treatments at any reasonable
level of significance, but we can easily reject pooling across volition conditions at all
reasonable levels of significance.  Proceeding in this manner, we obtain Figure 2:
Insert Figure 2 here
Comparing across treatment groups, the effort levels look roughly the same in the
center of the wage range.  However, we see significant differences at the extremes of the
wage range.  This would seem to offer an opportunity to separate equity and reciprocity
considerations.  The area in between the curves reflects intentional reciprocity since
intention is the only difference between the two treatments.  Yet, one cannot readily draw
conclusions since no structural form for utility has been specified.  Hence, we cannot
separate non-pecuniary concerns from pecuniary ones, much less equity from reciprocity.
One must estimate a functional form for utility.
Still, there are a few observations worth noting in figure 2: (1) Effort is rising at an
increasing rate as wage approaches 120.  This is counterintuitive since effort is costly at high
                                                                                                                                                                        
13 Charness (1996) finds a significant difference using a linear Tobit model.19
effort levels whereas the benefit to the employer from higher levels of effort is tiny or non-
existent as wage approaches 120.  We may attribute this to increasing importance on the
opponent's pay due to non-linear distributive concerns.  Alternatively, this phenomenon can
be explained by an equity notion defined by effort rather than by pay levels.  (2) At low
wages (less than 35), effort predictions are below 0.1.  Since we do not have observations
on effort levels below 0.1, these predictions arise from the Probit portion of the Tobit
procedure.
Let n denote the vector of parameter to be estimated for a given model.  Then for a
given model the functional of utility can be represented by UE (w, e; n).  The first step is to
differentiate UE (w, e; n) with respect to e. To do so we must first define a smooth
approximation for c(e).  The quadratic form is:
c(e) = 9.9 (e - 0.1) + 11.1 (e - 0.1)
2 (11)
The first order condition for maximization would be
de
) ; e , w ( dU E n
 = 0. (12)
Solving (12) for e, we get the optimal effort e as a function of w and n:
e = g(w ; n). (13)







f (eit - g (wit ; n))  it D  F (0.1 - g (wit ; n))
  it D 1- , (14)
where Dit (i indexes individuals and t indexes time) is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if
effort exceeds 0.1 and 0 otherwise.
6. ESTIMATION RESULTS
Detailed estimation results are given in Tables III-XIII.  Below we present a
summary for each model discussed above.  The parameter s is obtained for each model and
denotes the standard deviation.  We report the standard deviation as a measure of goodness
of fit.  We also compare the log-likelihood over models.  Note that all models are nested
within the encompassing (flexible polynomial) approach.
Table I The employer volition sessions (220 observations)
Model s s Log-likelihood
Pure pecuniary 0.779 -187.1
Simple altruism 0.612 -174.3
Fehr-Schmidt (one parameter) 0.600 -165.5
Fehr-Schmidt (two parameters) 0.600 -165.5
Rabin I 1.128 -211.7
Rabin II 0.353 -99.9
Unrestricted encompassing 0.334 -90.2
Given the above values for s and the log-likelihood for each model, one can make
some nested comparisons.  We observe that:
(1) Pure pecuniary considerations can be rejected in favor of pure altruism, or for that
matter, in favor of any one of the models estimated.21
(2) Though altruism is successful relative to a model of pure monetary considerations, it can
be rejected in favor of (an unrestricted
14 two-parameter) FS formulation.
(3) The two-parameter formulation of FS does not significantly outperform the one-
parameter version here.  This is expected given the inability by players to sacrifice payoff
for equality when they are already monetarily disadvantaged relative to others.
(4) Altruism can also be rejected in favor of the Rabin II version, showing promise for
Rabin's reciprocity definition as an explanation. As we will shortly demonstrate, this
success may be attributed to other factors.  Nonetheless, altruism alone cannot account
for the observed behavior.
(5) The Rabin I model of reciprocity can easily be rejected in favor of the Rabin II
formulation, demonstrating the relative importance of altruism in the determination of
non-pecuniary behavior.
(6) All four models of non-pecuniary motives can be rejected in favor of the flexible
polynomial approach.  This implies that Rabin I, Rabin II, and FS are over-restrictive.
However, a simple likelihood comparison reveals that Rabin II is substantially less so.
While restrictive forms result in a lower fit, they are often desirable due to theoretical
appeal.  If we insist on a restrictive form, Rabin II easily does best in the volition case.
However, one should be cautious in interpreting this superiority (in log likelihood terms) as
supporting the notions of reciprocity and altruism, as opposed to equity considerations. The
extent to which the reciprocity term in Rabin’s model captures equity consideration can be
assessed by estimating the same functional form of Rabin II for both volition and non-
volition.
If we desire a more flexible approach, the polynomial is not merely significantly
better in likelihood; it allows a comprehensive approach which nests all of the restricted
models, allows the relaxation of restrictions, and can potentially allow separating different
motives. Parameters estimated under the flexible approach show that the equality dummy
(D) is not significantly different than zero, dealing a further setback to the notion of equality
as a social reference point for equity.
                                                       
14 By unrestricted, we mean that we relax the FS restrictions that b £ a and 0 £ b < 1 in eq(4).22
Table II No employer volition (390 observations)
Model s s Log-likelihood
Pure pecuniary 0.782 -353.9
Unrestricted encompassing 0.323 -181.7
Simple altruism 0.516 -292.1
Fehr-Schmidt (one parameter) 0.603 -314.7
Rabin I 1.180 -433.0
Rabin II
15 0.343 -190.8
From the estimates under the non-volition treatments, we observe that:
(1) The (two-parameter unrestricted) Fehr-Schmidt model of equity does not explain the
data significantly better than altruism, by simple likelihood ratio statistic for nested
comparisons.
(2) All models can be rejected by nested comparison in favor of the flexible approach.
(3) In likelihood terms alone, the Rabin II (volitional) formulation best fits the non-volitional
treatments.
Given result (3) it would appear that the Rabin II form picks up some elements of
distributive concerns as opposed to reciprocity.  Our rejection of pure equality
considerations (FS) is perhaps best explained by recalling our assertion (section 4.2.1) that
equity is not the same as equality. It appears that the Rabin II formulation must be capturing
an equity notion that is not captured by FS.
Consider the following idea:
UE = PE + a PF + b |e - e
min| [P max
E - P min
E ]. (20)
                                                       
15 The non-volitional representation of Rabin II ought to reduce to the simple altruism model, given the
impossibility of observing employer kindness or unkindness.  Nonetheless, we estimate the volitional
formulation in the non-volitional case for the purpose of testing to what extent the “reciprocity term” in the
volition formulation truly captures reciprocity, as opposed to fairness.23
In this approach (henceforth the equity formulation) a is the simple altruism parameter.  The
parameter b is the weight on equity, where equity is measured as the distance of effort from
the minimum, and least equitable, level of effort.
16  [P max
E - P min
E ] simply re-scales the
equity term so that it is proportional to the range of payoffs of the employee.  In other
words, the employee’s attention to the fairness of his action does not diminish as his payoffs
increase. Wage enters into the equity term only to the extent that it affects the range of
payoffs. While the resulting formulation resembles Rabin’s, the interpretation is somewhat
different.
17
Equity formulation with volition





Equity formulation without volition





Notice that while in the case of volition, Rabin II somewhat outperforms the equity
formulation (LL comparison of -99.9 vs. -107.0; however, s is larger, 0.353 vs. 0.340), in
                                                       
16Alternatively, using Rabin's notion of equity, the equitable effort is that effort which would give the
employer the payoff that is midpoint between the maximum possible and the minimum possible, taking wage
as given.  That formulation gives a significantly worse fit as measured by likelihood.24
the non-volition case this is reversed (LL comparison of -184.5 vs. -190.8; s is also smaller,
0.323 vs. 0.343).
6.1 Robustness of parameter estimates
To test the predictive power of the flexible model out-of-sample, we estimate the
model’s parameters on a subset of games and use these estimates to predict the behavior in
another subset of games.  For this purpose, the composition of the two subsets must be
similar and the subset used to estimate the parameters for prediction must be large enough
to have a reasonable efficiency of parameter estimates.  For the predicted subset (subset II),
we chose the last five players from the bingo-cage treatment (by player index) and the first
five players (by player index) from the treatment where wages were experimenter-
determined.  We refer to the remaining subset of 29 players in the non-volition treatments as
subset I.
Likelihood ratio tests, on subsets I and II, are used to test for robustness. We
estimate parameters for one subset of games by maximum likelihood.  We then impose these
parameter estimates on a different subset and obtain the likelihood of the latter subset, called
the predicted subset, with the imposed parameters.
We find that the likelihood-ratio statistic of subset I relative to the full set of players
is 3.278, and the likelihood-ratio of subset II relative to the full set is 4.776; the respective
p-values are 0.773 and 0.573; the 5% critical value is 12.59 (c
2 distribution, 6 degrees of
freedom).  Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates from the
                                                                                                                                                                        
17 Rabin’s formulation implies that equity is considered in monetary terms and attention to equity is
dependent on wage.  The above formulation of equity implies that equity is considered in action terms and
that attention to equity is independent of wage.25
full set of games are valid for subsets I and II.  Further, the likelihood-ratio statistic for
predicting subset II from subset I is 9.849, with a p-value of 0.131.
18 Thus, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates from subset I are valid for subset II.  In
other words, the parameter estimates are stable across these subsets of games,
demonstrating the out-of-sample predictive power of the model.
6.2 Discussion
We wished to assess the relative success of various models of non-pecuniary motives
in explaining this experimental data.  First, it should be noted that each of the three
approaches (altruism, distributive concerns, and intentional reciprocity) have substantial
success in explaining the observed deviations relative to the null hypothesis of pecuniary
considerations alone. Which is best? Can we gain much from combining their insights?
The so-called equal division social reference point of FS and BO seems to
outperform a pure altruism explanation when employers determine wage.  However, this
reference point is inferior to pure altruism when wages are determined exogenously.  This
would seem to indicate that whatever equity considerations exist, they either (1) have a
social reference point different than equal division,
19 or (2) a disutility from inequitable
outcomes that is non-linear in distance from the reference point, or both.  Overall, it seems
that despite the important insight they provide, neither the simple altruism nor the pure
equity-based models can explain behavior in the two experiments analyzed in this paper.
                                                       
18 For subset I relative to the full set of players we get -2[(-100.745) - (-99.106)]; for subset II relative to the
full set this is -2[(-80.681) - (-78.293)]. The likelihood-ratio calculation for predicting subset II from subset I
is -2 [-42.0312  - (-37.1074)].
19 As would seem to be the case in real labor markets, where the firm is making far more than the employee
in monetary terms.26
The Rabin I model of reciprocity, which does not explicitly address distributive
concerns, is also unsuccessful.  On the other hand, the Rabin II formulation, which combines
notions of reciprocity and altruism, does fairly well.  However, estimation on the non-
volitional treatments suggests some weaknesses in this approach.  In particular, the success
of the reciprocity term in that model seems to be due to capturing distributive concerns in
the data rather than intentional reciprocity.
We also find that the restrictive equity formulation is rather successful among
restrictive models, thereby reinforcing the assertion made in the last paragraph as well as
suggesting that kindness may be measured in terms of actions rather than in terms of
payoffs.
We find that among all models the unrestricted encompassing model performs best.
Given the non-restrictive nature of the flexible approach, we can compare regard between
the volition and non-volition treatments. The difference in regard can only be attributed to
the difference in treatments; i.e., intention.  Figure 3 displays regard as a function of wage
for each treatment.  Figure 4 shows the difference in regard between treatments plotted on
wage.  Note that, in the center of the wage range, regard is roughly identical over
treatments.  The differences occur for “low” (roughly, wages less than 40) and “high”
(roughly, wages greater than 80) wages. Not surprisingly, regard is lower when the “low”
wage can be attributed to unkind, or selfish, intentions on the part of the employer.  A
surprising finding is that regard is lower in the volition treatment for “high” wages.  One
possible explanation is that when an outcome “unfair” to one party is willingly initiated by
that party, the other party does not feel an obligation to reduce this inequality.  On the other27
hand, if a provisional outcome is unfair to a party unable to participate to that point, this
party may feel a need for redress.
7. CONCLUSION
As non-pecuniary motives are becoming recognized in mainstream economics and
models of non-pecuniary behavior are proposed, it is useful to make comparisons of the
effectiveness of such models in explaining observed behavior.  We do so by nesting a
number of models of pecuniary and non-pecuniary behavior within each other as well as
within a flexible encompassing approach.  Nested comparisons reveal that distributive
concerns, altruism, and intentional reciprocity each contributed significantly to explaining
non-pecuniary motives. Furthermore, comparing FS to a flexible approach and Rabin II in
the non-volition treatments seems to suggest that distributive concerns are not likely to be
linear in the payoff difference.
Another contribution of this essay is the flexible approach to estimation and testing.
While this approach cannot be generalized to all settings, it is nonetheless warranted where
possible.  Though parsimony is reduced by adding parameters, we believe it is valuable to
combine the insights of the various approaches into a richer model.  We do not offer a
complete model or a theoretical justification for the form of our flexible regard function or
for the equity formulation; yet it is clear that these do a better job of fitting the data.
The flexible formulation (in particular its nesting properties and good fit of the data)
allows us to separate intentional reciprocity from distributive concerns, demonstrating the
existence of reciprocal behavior at low and high wages. We find that while unkind behavior
is reciprocated with unkind behavior, kind behavior by the employer that puts the employer28
at a disadvantage may result in less attention to equity by the employee, as the unequal
outcome is not considered to be the responsibility of the employee.
We feel that any successful model must accommodate the concerns of altruism,
distributive concerns, and intentional reciprocity and suggest that further research is needed
to develop a more descriptive model.  It is true that our conclusions must be limited, as we
only analyze data from one experiment.  However, while we offer no formal analysis,
evidence from some recent experiments also supports the view that intentional reciprocity
plays an important role in non-pecuniary motives.  Abbink et al (1997) and Offerman (1998)
show strong effects for reciprocity and the latter paper also indicates that the causal
attribution for an outcome significantly affects the sequential choice made.  These results
point to the need for alternative explanations of observed non-pecuniary behavior.
It may be presumptuous to even suggest that one can identify all the important
influences on choices made in economic contexts.  Yet we hope that analyses such as the
one in this essay can lead to descriptive models which both capture important motives and
preserve substantial parsimony.29
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Figure 2 A Tobit regression of effort on wage, using a fifth-degree polynomial
20
                                                       
20 Predicted effort levels below 0.1 are not in the range of efforts available to subjects and are due to the
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Tables of Parameter Estimates for the various models under the Volitional treatment
III. The Unrestricted Encompassing Model
21
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic
a -0.704 1.951 -0.361
b 0.033 0.131 0.249
c -2.57E-04 3.16E-03 -0.081
d -2.23E-06 3.30E-05 -0.067
e 3.12E-08 1.25E-07 0.249
d
22 --- --- ---
s 0.338 0.025 13.545





a 0.104 0.017 6.082
s 0.612 0.055 11.147
Log-likelihood =    -174.257
V. The one-parameter FS Formulation
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic
b 0.140 0.018 7.638
s 0.600 0.043 13.852
Log-likelihood -165.475
VI. The two-parameter Fehr-Schmidt formulation
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic
23
b 0.140 0.018 7.638
a 0.181E-04 0.029 0.629E-03
s 0.600 0.043 13.852
Log-likelihood -165.475
                                                       
21 d is restricted to the positive range, in accordance with the Fehr-Schmidt model.
22 Restricted to the positive real numbers, in accordance with FS.  Not found to significantly differ from 0.
23 The a parameter is restricted to be positive.  The t-statistic shows that a is not significant. Hereafter, only
the one-parameter formulation will be presented under Fehr-Schmidt.  However, the test for significance was
conducted for each treatment and a is never significant.35
VII. Rabin I
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic
s 1.128 0.139 8.109
Log-likelihood -211.67
VIII. Rabin II
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic
a 0.314 0.105 30.035
s 0.353 0.022 16.370
Log-likelihood  -99.86
Tables of Parameter Estimates for the various models under the non-volitional
treatments
IX. The Unrestricted Encompassing Model
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic
 a 0.223 0.293 0.762
 b -0.024 0.028 -0.869
 c 9.99E-04 8.87E-04 1.127
 d -1.46E-05 1.18E-05 -1.234
 e 7.77E-08 5.60E-08 1.387
d
24 --- --- ---
s 0.323 0.0156 20.768
Log likelihood   -181.733




a 0.156 0.010 15.828
s 0.516 0.034 15.408
Log-likelihood =    -292.099




b 0.143 0.013 11.021






s 1.180 0.061 19.330
Log-likelihood -432.972
XIII. Rabin II
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic
a 0.328 0.006 59.640
s 0.343 0.016 22.101
Log-likelihood    -190.810
                                                                                                                                                                        
24 Restricted to the positive real numbers, in accordance with FS.  Not found significantly different from
zero.37
APPENDIX A- Wage/effort pairs
Employer-generated wages
Effort








40 7 13 4 1 1
45 3
50 7 1 7 4 1
55 2 3
60 9 3 2 10 6 5
61 1
65 1 1 1 1 1
70 6 2 1 5 5 6 2 2
75 3 1 2 1 1
79 1 1
80 5 1 2 2 1 2
85 3
90 3 2 1
92 1
94 1









Wage .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
20 17 3 2
25 2 1 1 1
30 2
35 2 2
40 9 1 3 2
45 5 2 1
50 4 1 2 3 1 2
55 1 1 1
60 10 4 7 10 5 1 1 3
65 1 2 1
70 8 4 1 2 7 4 1 138
75 4 3 1 2 3 2
80 4 1 4 3 1 1 4 1 1
85 2 1 1
90 2 1 2 1
Third-party-generated wages
Effort




35 7 1 1
40 9 3 4 1
45 1 2 3 2
50 3 4 5 2
55 2 1
60 13 2 4 7 14 2 1
65 2 1 1
70 10 2 2 5 10 2 2
75 2 2 2 1 1 2 3
80 10 1 2 2 7 1
85 1 1 1 1 1
90 1 1 2 1
Results by wage bracket
Wage range      Average effort
                  Employer      Random    Third party
           N      N       N
20-29 .1000  41 .1778   27 .1300    20
30-39 .1333   9 .1333    6 .1833    12
40-49 .2241  25 .2348   23 .2120    25
50-59 .2880  29 .4062   16 .3235    17
60-69 .3561  41 .3711   45 .3489    47
70-79 .4718  39 .3954   43 .3848    46
80-89 .4000  16 .4708   24 .4393    28
90+ .5200  20 .5500    6 .4800     5
Total .3127 220 .3463  190 .3220   200
Wage range      Average effort
                  Employer  Random  Third party
           N     N       N
20-39 .1060  50 .1697   33 .1500    32
40-59 .2537  54 .3051   39 .2571    42
60-79 .4125  80 .3829   88 .3667    93
80+ .4667  36 .4867   30 .4455    33
Total .3127 220 .3463  190 .3220   20039
APPENDIX B -TIME EFFECTS












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1040









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
If reputation were important in effort determination, we should expect effort, or the effort-wage ratio, computed










     Non-
Intentional
Avg. Effort





1 51.2 .2909 .00612 58.1 .3513 .00660
2 52.0 .2682 .00526 57.6 .3333 .00621
3 54.6 .3409 .00697 57.3 .3180 .00584
4 55.8 .3227 .00623 56.8 .3513 .00683
5 52.8 .2864 .00569 57.7 .3231 .00592
6 57.2 .3409 .00647 55.9 .3000 .00557
7 57.7 .3273 .00603 56.7 .3154 .00587
8 56.6 .3046 .00559 53.3 .3359 .00708
9 58.4 .3227 .00580 56.7 .3026 .00552
10 52.4 .2864 .00575 64.4 .3744 .00618
A casual look at the average wages and effort levels does not seem to support learning taking place
in any period. The average-wage line seems relatively flat and the average effort level does not seem do
display a pattern over time.
Visual evidence must be supplemented by rigorous testing.  Let  t q  be the average effort at time t.
The F-test is a joint test of the hypotheses: Ho:  1 ￿ 10 q + - = . . . =  10 q , which can take into account individual
effects.  Rejection of H0 is necessary and sufficient to reject pooling.
We briefly describe the F-test: The F-test compares the unrestricted regression, qit = m + ai di + btDt
+ e, to the restricted regression, qit = m + ai di + e, where di is an individual dummy, Dt is a time dummy, and
ai, bt, and m are parameters to be estimated.  We impose two identification restrictions: St ai = 0 and Si bt = 0.
It is easily verifiable, given the restrictions, that the estimate for m will be the mean effort.41
For each run, we first calculate the mean effort for the entire population over all time periods, q ,
the mean effort for each individual i over all time periods,  ￿ i q , and the mean effort in each time period t
over all individuals,  t q￿ .  The estimated individual effect (subject to the identification restrictions) for
individual i is  i Æ ˆ  =  ￿ i q - q . The estimated time effect in period t (subject to the identification restrictions) is
t ￿ ˆ  =  t q￿ - q .  The F-test is as follows:
(1) We compute the unrestricted residuals by subtracting from each observation on effort, qit, the average
effort, q , the estimated individual effect,  i Æ ˆ , and the estimated time effect, bt.
(2) We compute the restricted residuals by subtracting from each observation on effort only the mean effort
and estimated individual effect.
(3) The F-statistic is calculated as [(RSSR – USSR) / (T - 1)] / [USSR / (N T – (N - 1) - (T – 1) - 1)],
where RSSR is the restricted sum of squared residuals, USSR is the unrestricted sum of squared
residuals, T is the number of time periods, and N is the number of individuals.
The F-statistics for the treatments of employer-determined wages, bingo-cage wages, and experimenter-
determined wages are 0.254, 0.777, and 0.300, respectively.  Under the null hypothesis of no time effects,
these statistics should be distributed F (9, 188), F (9, 161), and F (9, 170), respectively.  The respective
critical values at the 5% level of significance are 1.930, 1.938, and 1.935.  Hence we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no time effects at the 5% significance level.